









DEBT AND EXTINCTION OF FIRMS*
António Antunes** | José Mata*** | Pedro Portugal**
But learn that to die is a debt we must all pay.
Eurípides
Summary
The fact that a ﬁ  rm comes to the end of its activity through bankruptcy may be 
traumatic for its creditors. A ﬁ  rm which stops trading and voluntarily pays off its debts 
will rarely represent a signiﬁ  cant economic problem. In this article we shall endeavour 
to validate the theoretical results which, in general, show that the higher the debt 
the greater the probability of exit through bankruptcy and lower the probability of 
voluntary liquidation. Using data from the Central Credit Register and staff payrolls, we 
show that all things being equal, a ﬁ  rm with double the amount of debt in comparison 
to another will have a 25 per cent higher annual probability of exit through bankruptcy, 
whereas the probability, in the case of exit through voluntary liquidation, will fall to 
5 per cent. These results have evident implications for the pricing of loans to non-
ﬁ  nancial corporations in debt, owing to the fact that the higher the probabilities of 
exit, the higher the credit spreads.
1. Introduction
A ﬁ  rm can cease to trade in many different ways. One possibility is for its exit to be planned in advance; 
i.e. the ﬁ  rm is closed in an orderly manner. In this case, debts to credit institutions and suppliers will 
be settled, employees will be notiﬁ  ed of the closure prospects and, after the necessary procedures, its 
representatives will formally close the ﬁ  rm down. At the other end of the spectrum we have classic 
bankruptcy in which a ﬁ  rm simply ceases to trade without paying its debts either in full or in part. In 
many cases, the owners and workers will be penalised. Although there may be a mixture of elements 
pertaining to both situations, our aim is to reduce this variety of situations to these two extreme cases.
This essay aims to use empirical data to study the factors which lead a ﬁ  rm to stop trading either in the 
form of an orderly liquidation or through bankruptcy. More speciﬁ  cally, we are interested in the relation-
ship which may exist between the amount of a ﬁ  rm’s debt and the way in which its exit is programmed. 
The reply to this question is also a test of theories on corporate debt which have been dealt with in the 
economic literature over the last thirty years.
*  The opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Banco de Portugal or the Eurosys-
tem. Any errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.
**  Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.































































Different theories suggest different predictions regarding the probability of an exit and its respective 
form. Economists believe that, in efﬁ  cient markets with low monitoring and ﬁ  nancing costs, it is the 
less efﬁ  cient ﬁ  rms that cease to trade, as opposed to ﬁ  rms with the best projects which remain in the 
market. This conclusion, however, may not be applicable in cases of information asymmetries between 
ﬁ  rms and banks or different incentives between managers and investors.
As regards our particular interest, i.e. the issue of whether an eventual exit is voluntary or through 
bankruptcy,1 the ﬁ  rst argument is expounded by Ross (1977) and is based on the asymmetry of the 
existing information between a ﬁ  rm’s managers and external agents, particularly credit institutions.2 
In simple terms, managers of good ﬁ  rms have an incentive to increase the amount of a ﬁ  rm’s debt 
to indicate a low probability of ceasing to trade. Over indebtedness works because, in the case of its 
occurrence, it increases the probability of an exit being through bankruptcy, which would force them to 
incur major losses in the form of reputational losses, a reduction of income or even legal costs. External 
agents understand that, in the event of liquidation, managers incur major losses and accordingly deduce 
that if a ﬁ  rm were a bad ﬁ  rm, they would not wish to incur large debts and the ﬁ  rm must, therefore, be 
a good ﬁ  rm. In empirical terms this argument implies, ceteris paribus, that, in the case of an exit, debt 
should increase the probability of an exit through bankruptcy.
The second argument is based on the differences between the incentives existing between the owners 
of ﬁ  rms and the parties holding their debt and has, for example, been developed by Myers (2001). 
Owners of ﬁ  rms with large debts have an incentive to pursue riskier business strategies. Let us consider 
a project with a low possibility of success, but which, in the event of success, will make a large proﬁ  t; 
in the event of failure, the losses are also high. In this situation, the beneﬁ  ts of success will essentially 
go to the ﬁ  rms’ owners, who will only repay debts as per the agreed terms and keep the rest; in the 
event of the project’s failure, the losses will essentially go to the parties holding the debt, as there will 
not be any resources to repay them. For managers, the gains are truncated at a lower but not a higher 
level; for the parties holding the debt, the gains are truncated at a higher level but could result in losses 
as high as the global amount of the debt. This asymmetry between gains induces a rational choice of 
this strategy as opposed to a strategy with a high possibility of repaying the debt but which would limit 
managers’ potential gains.
There is also an argument (see Jensen, 1986) which defends that the simple existence of debt is associ-
ated with a higher probability of exit. The argument goes as follows: if an investment opportunity needs 
internal funding because it involves a high amount of debt, the owner will have to inject the required 
capital; however, he may not beneﬁ  t in full from the investment gains as the ﬁ  rm could, in the mean-
time, cease to trade. This implies that several proﬁ  table investments are not made, which increases the 
probability of exit. In principle, the argument is valid both for exit through bankruptcy and voluntary 
liquidation. We do not, however, expect to see a signiﬁ  cant impact of debt in the case of voluntary exit 
because the problem arises when debt levels are high and when only internal ﬁ  nancing can be used, 
which means that, in the case of exit, a ﬁ  rm will ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to avoid bankruptcy.
There are many other arguments linking debt with bankruptcy. In general, almost all of them forecast 
a positive relationship between the level of debt and the probability of bankruptcy. In addition and 
as we have noted, in the argument set out in the preceding paragraph, the level of debt is also likely 
to be associated with a lower probability of voluntary exit. Cases in which a ﬁ  rm promptly settles its 
debts suggest that the problems of agency and asymmetry of information associated with debt are not 
1  The concept of bankruptcy that we use is not a legal one, but the notion of exit of activity without full repay-
ment of the debt, as we shall see. The reader interested in a more detailed treatment of these arguments should 
see Mata, Antunes and Portugal (2010).
2  We admit that the company managers have their interests aligned with those of its owners. This is certainly a 
natural assumption in many companies, but for some, especially large companies, managers and business own-









relevant; and explains why, in the above case, we also expect a negative impact of debt in the prob-
ability of voluntary exit.3
The empirical results conﬁ  rm these theoretical forecasts. Using the base statistical speciﬁ  cation, we esti-
mate that, in the case of a standard ﬁ  rm, the doubling of the level of debt corresponds to an increase 
of around 25% in the probability of exit through bankruptcy (from 1.9 per cent to 2.3 per cent per 
annum), and a reduction of around 5 per cent in the probability of voluntary exit (from 4.1 per cent to 
4 per cent per annum). Given the probabilities of exit through bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation for 
a standard ﬁ  rm, this implies a total increase in the probability of exit from 6 to 6.3 per cent per annum, 
i.e. the debt level has a major impact on the occurrence of bankruptcies and a lesser impact in terms of 
voluntary liquidations, in the opposite direction; as the probability of exit of a standard ﬁ  rm is greater 
through voluntary liquidation than through bankruptcy, the global probability of exit is relatively unaf-
fected by the level of debt.
2. Empirical data and modelling strategy
The type of question to which we aim to reply is suitable for a modelling exercise in which there are 
three mutually exclusive options available, at the end of each period: continuation of activity, voluntary 
liquidation and bankruptcy. This data structure suggests the use of multinomial discrete choice statistical 
models which is the strategy we shall adopt. But before delving into the issue of modelling, let us take 
a look at the available data and the way in which we shall characterise each of the above referred to 
options. This deviation will be useful to improve our understanding of the modelling options taken and 
our interpretation of the results. For debt information we shall be using Banco de Portugal’s Central 
Credit Register (CRC), a database housing information on all credit relationships between non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations and credit institutions operating in Portugal. Although the debt measurements registered 
in the CRC may seem limitative, as they do not include debt issued by the ﬁ  rms, it is a well known 
fact that in Portugal, as in the case of other countries on mainland Europe, most credit relationships 
are processed between banks and ﬁ  rms and the issue of debt ﬁ  nance or capital offerings in organised 
markets are relatively restricted. In addition to the credit component, we also require several measures 
to characterise ﬁ  rms, known to be relevant to their level of debt, such as dimension, sector of activity, 
age, etc. Such data are obtained from staff payrolls. These data are published annually and cover estab-
lishments with employees and include variables such as the number of employees, volume of sales in 
the preceding year, date of the ﬁ  rm’s foundation and sector of activity. In this article we shall be using 
data for the period 1995-2000.
2.1. Firm exits and their classiﬁ  cation
To identify ﬁ  rm exits we use the following methodology. As the staff payroll survey is mandatory in 
Portugal, we consider that an exit always occurs when a given ﬁ  rm is absent from the database for two 
consecutive years. Therefore, if a ﬁ  rm reports its staff payrolls for a year t  and continues to be absent 
in the years  1 t +  and  2 t +  we consider that there must have been an exit during the year t . Several 
other adjustments were made to the data, namely when there is only one year in which the report is 
missing; in these cases we ﬁ  ll in the data for the missing year with the average of the preceding years 
and following year.4 After the two databases have been linked we obtain each ﬁ  rm’s credit history. The 
next step consists of classifying exits as bankruptcies or voluntary liquidations. We deﬁ  ne bankruptcy as 
an exit in which a ﬁ  rm had a register of signiﬁ  cant credit in default, in accordance with the CRC’s credit 
3  For a more detailed description of these arguments, as well as a more exhaustive treatment of the issues raised 
in this article, see Mata et al. (2010).































































classiﬁ  cation, in the two years following the exit. Both the total amount of credit and the part in default 
(if any) were calculated by aggregating the respective amounts for all of the credit institutions with which 
the ﬁ  rm in question had a relationship. All other cases were considered to be voluntary liquidations in 
which a ﬁ  rm succeeds in meeting its credit liabilities (if any), in full, in the two years following its exit.
To centre our analysis on ﬁ  rms with banking relationships, we only consider observations in which a 
ﬁ  rm had a positive amount of debt in the present or the preceding year or both. Out of a total number 
of 229,630 observations for the years 1995 to 1998, the propensity to exit is relatively low, with a total 
annual average of exits of 6 per cent of ﬁ  rms. Moreover, a 69 to 31 per cent split was observed between 
exits through voluntary liquidation and exits through bankruptcy (Table 1).
2.2. Debt and control variables
The most important of the explanatory variables, i.e. variables which help us rationalise ﬁ  rms’ different 
exit or continuation modes, is the level of debt. As is usually the case in the literature, we shall be using 
the amount of debt logarithm in euros plus 1 euro, owing to the fact that there are observations with 
nil debt. In the case of exits through bankruptcy, ﬁ  rms are, on average, more in debt (around EUR 69 
thousand) than the average for ﬁ  rms which continue to operate (around EUR 16 thousand), and those 
which exit through voluntary liquidation (around EUR 3 thousand). These observations ﬁ  rstly suggest 
that the technical arguments expounded above may be sustained empirically. However, as we are aware 
of numerous examples in the economic literature, which do not take into consideration other important 
dimensions relating to ﬁ  rms’ exit processes, we may be led into drawing the wrong conclusions from 
our results (Table 1).
What other aspects – in addition to debt levels – may also be important to explain the phenomenon of 
ﬁ  rms’ exits? One of them will be a ﬁ  rm’s dimension. In this case, we use the logarithm of the number 
of employees. In general terms, surviving ﬁ  rms tend to be the larger ﬁ  rms, if we gauge their size by the 
number of employees. Converting the logarithmic units into natural units, the corporate survivors have 
an average of around 8.1 workers, in comparison to 5.4 and 3.6 workers for ﬁ  rms which exit through 
bankruptcy or voluntary liquidation. As regards the duration of activity of ﬁ  rms, no major differences 
have been observed between ﬁ  rms which exit through liquidation or through bankruptcy. In both cases 
their average age on exit is around 12 years, in comparison to 14.6 years for the ﬁ  rms total (Table 1).
These observations forthwith appear to indicate that more debt, fewer employees and shorter duration 
of activity favour exits through bankruptcy, as opposed to remaining in operation. By contrast, less debt 
Table 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SAMPLE
Permanence Exit Total
Voluntary liquidation Bankruptcy
No. of observations 215,783 9,569 4,278 229,630
Variable
Log (1 + debt) average 9.7 8.1 11.1 9.6
standard deviation 3.4 3.7 2.1 3.5
Log (no. of employees) average 2.1 1.3 1.7 2.1
standard deviation 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2
Age average 14.8 11.8 12.0 14.6
standard deviation 12.5 11.4 11.3 12.4









favours exit through voluntary liquidation as opposed to continuing to operate; in the case of the other 
two variables the effect is the same as the case of exit through bankruptcy. These observations, however, 
are only suggestive of the ﬁ  nal effects and must be validated by a regression analysis.
To eliminate the speciﬁ  city of the sector of activity and systematic impact of macroeconomic ﬂ  uctuations 
we also add categorical variables by sector of activity (with a speciﬁ  c granularity) and for the year to 
which the observation refers.
One objection that can be raised to this choice of regressors is that all of these variables are measuring 
the same thing: the older a ﬁ  rm the bigger it will be and the greater its capacity to apply for bank loans. 
The estimation method we use will take this into account. Even if this association exists, the estimation 
method of the parameters of the chosen model (described later) is based on the comparison of changes 
of the exit modes of ﬁ  rms attributable to changes in the variable under study, taking all of the other 
variables as constants. A more profound objection is as follows. Suppose that there is an unknown vari-
able and that this determines, to a large extent, a ﬁ  rm’s exit mode. One example is the capacity of the 
businessman in question. Therefore when we estimate our models, and do not include that variable 
among the regressors, we are attributing all of the changes in the exit mode to changes in debt, when 
a part should have been attributed to the variable we have omitted.5 For readers who are more familiar 
with econometric terminology, the variable we are studying is correlated with the statistical model term 
error, i.e. with the part of the statistical model which captures everything of which we are unaware 
and which also inﬂ  uences the exit. To resolve this problem, economists use instrumental variables or 
instruments. In this case we should like to access a variable which, not having been included in the list 
of variables having a systemic effect on the exits, is, nevertheless associated with our variable of interest 
(in our case the level of debt), conditional upon the remaining regressors. The instrument should not 
suffer from the same problem as the variable of interest, i.e. it should not be correlated with the error 
term. A suggestion could be the change of one (or more) of the variables we have quoted, including the 
actual debt. This procedure places more emphasis on a ﬁ  rm’s temporal evolution and if, in the case of a 
businessman’s capacity, it remains constant over time, we have a possible instrument. A more detailed 
treatment of this topic is outside the scope of this work (see e.g. Train, 2009); and we shall content 
ourselves with estimating an instrumental variations regression.
2.3. Statistical modelling
The modelling strategy may be described as conventional. There are three mutually exclusive possibilities 
in each period: continuing to operate, exit through voluntary liquidation and exit through bankruptcy. 
This structure suggests a multinomial choice model, such as the logit or multinomial probit model.
The speciﬁ  c model we shall be using has a multinomial probit speciﬁ  cation. It is a mutually exclusive multiple 
choice model, in which one of the possible choices is deﬁ  ned as the reference and the remaining options 
are compared with this reference. In formal terms, we shall assume that the relevant characteristics of 
the ﬁ  rm i  in the year t  are summarised by the vector  it x  and that the beneﬁ  t of the option  0,1,2 j = is
,
j
it it j jit ux ge =+
in which  j g  is a regression coefﬁ  cients vector,  jit e  is a random error with normal distribution and the 
index  j  is 0 in the case of a ﬁ  rm which continues to operate, 1 in the case of voluntary exit and 2 in 
5  Note also that the same problem will occur if the exit type has some inﬂ  uence on debt. For example, if the threat 
of bankruptcy exit entails a higher debt, then the result you want to study inﬂ  uences the level of debt itself. This 































































the case of bankruptcy.6 The decision is made in accordance with the beneﬁ  t in each option. The option 
m  is chosen if and only if 
mj
it it uu ³  for all  jm ¹ . If  it y  is a random variable which gives us the option 
chosen by the ﬁ  rm i  in the year t  what we have expounded above implies that the probability of choice 
being m  is Pr( ) Pr( for all ).
mj
it it it ym uu j m == ³ ¹
If we pay careful attention, the model of the preceding equation is invariant if (i) we add the same constant 
to all of the equations (which does not change the order when we compare the different options) and 
(ii) we change the magnitude of the standard error deviations by the same factor (for a rather more 
obscure reason, and which will remain so if the reader does not, for example, consult, Long and Freese, 
2006, page. 272). The fact (i) implies that the decisions are made on the basis of the difference between 
the beneﬁ  t attached to the different alternatives, for which, choosing one alternative as a reference 
– e.g.  0 j =  continuing to operate – we can express the model in terms of such differences. Deﬁ  ning 
0 jj
it it it vu u =-, 







Pr( 1) Pr( and 0)
Pr( 2) Pr( and 0)
it it it
it it it
it it it it















As we have the expressions for the 
j
it v ‘s in terms of the  jit e ‘s and accept that the errors have a normal 
distribution, we can use the bivariate normal distribution to calculate the above probabilities, condi-
tional on  1 b  and  2 b . We then maximise the likelihood of the sample (basically the product of all of the 
probabilities, one for each observation) in these two parameter vectors. We must also, maximise with 
respect to variance 2it e ; the observation (ii) above implies that we can normalise the variance of  1it e  to 1.
3. Results
Chart 1 gives a graphical representation of the results of several multinomial regressions. For each type 
of exit (liquidation or bankruptcy) and for each of the four regressions, the bar is proportional to the 
value of the coefﬁ  cient associated with the debt. We should remember that the economic literature 
forecasts that a higher level of debt will be corresponded to by a lower propensity to exit the activity 
through voluntary liquidation and a greater tendency to exit through bankruptcy. This conclusion is 
suggested by the regression (1), which uses only the level of debt as a regressor. We note that, in this 
case, the coefﬁ  cient associated with exit through voluntary liquidation is negative and that it is positive 
in the case of exit through bankruptcy. In the context of a multinomial probit model, this corresponds 
to a reduction of the probability of exit through voluntary liquidation and an increase in the probability 
of exit through bankruptcy. This result is entirely consistent with the arguments presented in section 1.
It can now be argued as follows: the result is spurious because debt is only one measure of a ﬁ  rm’s 
creditworthiness; explicit consideration should be given to variables related with the ﬁ  rm’s track record 
and its macroeconomic or sectoral environment. To obviate such arguments, the regression (2) shows 
the result when we include, in addition to the debt, annual and sectoral dummies, the age of the ﬁ  rm 
and the square of the age of the ﬁ  rm. This latter variable aims to capture the non-linear effects of age 
in the decision to exit. The initial result remains: more debt implies greater propensity to exit through 
bankruptcy and lesser propensity to exit through voluntary liquidation.
6  The errors are considered independent across equations and observations. We also considered speciﬁ  cations 
that allow for correlation across equations but this modeling is much more complex and is therefore outside the 









Another argument goes like this: debt may be a measure of a ﬁ  rm’s dimension and it is a well known 
fact that ﬁ  rms with better projects, i.e. with a lesser possibility of going bankrupt, will grow. In addition 
to the former controls, the regression (3) includes, a measure of the ﬁ  rm’s dimension: the logarithm 
of the number of workers. In this case, we obtain a signiﬁ  cant reinforcement of the debt’s magnitude 
in exits through bankruptcy and an attenuation of the effect of the reduction of the probability of exit 
through voluntary liquidation. The use of the number of workers in a ﬁ  rm enables the dimension effect 
of the debt’s effect to be isolated.7 The coefﬁ  cient associated with the ﬁ  rm’s dimension is similar for the 
two types of exit and is equivalent to around double the coefﬁ  cient associated with the debt variable 
in exits through bankruptcy.
The regression (4) consisted of the use of instruments to eliminate the effects of distortion in our esti-
mates per omitted variable or endogeneity of the regressors – see section 2.2. The instrumental vari-
ables used are annual variations of both debt and the number of employees’ logarithms. The estimation 
technique used is referred to in Train (2009). In this case it is reassuring to note that the debt’s effect 
remains practically unchanged.
7  Including other variables for size, such as annual sales, does not entail signiﬁ  cant differences relative to these 
results.
Chart 1
THE EFFECT OF DEBT
Multinomial probit regression model with the following speciﬁ  cations:
(1) only debt as a regressor;
(2) the previous plus annual and sectoral dummies, the ﬁ  rm age and ﬁ  rm age squared;
(3) the previous plus the logarithm of the number of workers;
(4) The previous using instrumental variables.
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, Banco de Portugal (Central Credit Register) and authors’ calculations.
Note: All values as a fraction of the coefﬁ  cient for debt in exit by bankruptcy of regression (3). The omitted category is continuation 
of activity. All coefﬁ  cients are signiﬁ  cant at the 1% level.































































We have already referred to the fact that errors can be multiplied by a positive arbitrary factor without 
changing our results. The consequence of this is that the scale of the coefﬁ  cients of chart 1 is, per se, 
arbitrary. Although a comparison of the magnitude of the coefﬁ  cients for the different variables and for the 
two equations is a fully valid exercise, to verify whether or not the debt’s effect is substantial, its marginal 
effects should be estimated. A possible measure is the average change in the probability of the exit in 
question, calculated for the sample, triggered by a change in the variable of interest, in this case debt. 
Let us consider the reference regression (3). Based on the estimated model we can calculate the average 
probability, for the sample, of an exit through liquidation or bankruptcy. The values we obtain are 4.1 
per cent per annum for exit through voluntary liquidation and 1.9 per cent per annum for exit through 
bankruptcy. In addition, however, we can also obtain a reasonable estimate of the average probability 
of exit if, for example, each ﬁ  rm’s debt were double its initial level. The result is represented in chart 2.
The conclusion reached from the chart is that the quantitative effect on the probability of exit through 
bankruptcy is high and is smaller in the probability of global exit (i.e. including both types of exit). We 
note that when the debt level is doubled, there is an increase of around 25 per cent in the probability 
of exit through bankruptcy; the reduction of the probability of voluntary exit is around 5 per cent of 
the original level. In global terms, these values imply an increase in the probability of exit from 6 to 6.2 
per cent per annum. As a reference number we estimate that a 10 per cent reduction of a ﬁ  rm’s debt 
implies, under certain simplifying hypotheses and through the reduction of the probability of bankruptcy, 
a maximum reduction of around 7 basis points in the interest rate charged.8
8  The hypotheses are:perfect competition in the credit market, total loss in case of bankruptcy, voluntary liquida-
tion losses negligible. See Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2007) for a model in which the prob-
ability of default affects the interest rate charged by the credit institution, according to Δi = Δp, where Δi is the 
change in interest rate charged and Δp is the variation of the probability of bankruptcy.
Chart 2
IMPACT OF LEVEL OF DEBT IN THE EXIT PROBABILITIES
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, Banco de Portugal (Central Credit Register) and authors’ calculations.
Note: For each observation, the probability of exit by voluntary liquidation or bankruptcy is estimated both for the initial level of debt, 
and twice that level. The values in the chart are sample averages of those probabilities.




























EXIT PROBABILITY AND FIRM SIZE
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, Banco de Portugal (Central Credit Register) and authors’ calculations.
Note: For each observation, the probability of exit by voluntary liquidation or bankruptcy is estimated holding constant the dimen-
sion variable at the 10 and 90 percentile level. The values in the chart are sample averages of those probabilities.
A last issue is related with the inﬂ  uence of the ﬁ  rm’s dimension, as measured by the logarithm of the number 
of employees in the probability of exit. Chart 3 shows that the dimension has an enormous inﬂ  uence on the 
probability of exit. For example, a relatively small ﬁ  rm i.e. a ﬁ  rm with a number of workers equal to the 10th 
percentile of this variable in the sample (2 employees), has estimated average probabilities of exit of 7.4 per 
cent through voluntary liquidation and 4.6 per cent through bankruptcy. By contrast, for a relatively large 
ﬁ  rm (in the 90th percentile of the dimension, 37 employees) the same probabilities are 1 and 0.65 per cent.
4. Conclusion
The results of this work suggest that a ﬁ  rm’s debt is an essential determinant for the calculation of the prob-
ability of exit and the form in which it is processed. The above afﬁ  rmation is consistent with the voluminous 
literature on debt and the exit of ﬁ  rms. As, in most of these works, there has been a tendency to identify 
any type of exit as a bankruptcy, we show that on most occasions exits are processed in a relatively orderly 
manner and without leaving too many unpaid debts. What is the difference between the two situations? 
The difference is debt, that helping hand as well as harbinger of failure. If, on the one hand debt makes it 
possible to improve efﬁ  ciency in the allocation of resources and exploit a project’s potential, on the other 
hand it generates powerful incentives to strategic moral hazard behaviour and translates into palpable effects 
in the probability of credit default.
The results of this work may lend support to the notion that, as opposed to what should be displayed by 
a frictionless economy, in an economy with agency and information asymmetry and other problems, the 
probability of a ﬁ  rm’s extinction, and particularly extinction in the form of a traumatic bankruptcy process, 
is considerably dependent on debt levels. It goes without saying that this increased risk is reﬂ  ected in the 
interest rate charged: ﬁ  rms with more debt, in the presence of ﬁ  nancial frictions, face higher interest rates. 
This is a painful situation which economic agents or even countries in debt must face.
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